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INTRODUCTION

Regulatory reform of telephone service markets has changed direction in
the last decade. Rather than cutting back on the range and depth of
regulatory activities, it has expanded these activities by having regulatory
agencies take on the task of increasing the competitiveness of regulated
markets. The California Legislature and the state's regulatory agency, the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), have been in the lead in
fulfilling this new mandate. Based on Assembly Bill 3606,' the CPUC has
developed a new process for establishing competition in both local and
long-distance telephone services. The CPUC's New Regulatory Framework
(NRF) replaces cost-of-service price regulation with price caps on companies'
charges for service.2 It has opened up previously exclusive local exchange
markets to duplicative service providers and has opened up local toll markets
to the entry of the interstate long-distance companies.3 In the near future,
the CPUC's Framework will accommodate entry of the local exchange
service providers into long-distance services across the state.
Yet even with these radical changes, the CPUC's service requirements
from incumbent local carriers are no different than those in place for the last
twenty years. Incumbents still have to provide access to the local system to
all comers, including both farflung rural subscribers on one side of the switch
and the largest long-distance carriers on the other side of the switch. But
the resources required to continue to provide these services have been
impacted by the new pro-competitive policies.
The 1990 NRF, seeking to establish "a form of incentive regulation
which, after careful review and weighing of the pros and cons of traditional
regulation and the proposed alternatives, we conclude is likely to outperform
traditional regulation," 5 put caps on prices that caused shortfalls in the
earnings required to achieve previously allowed returns on invested capital.6

1. 1994 Cal. Stat. 1260 (ordering that all telecommunications markets be opened to
competition no later than January 1, 1997 and requiring the CPUC to take steps to ensure that
competition in telecommunications markets is fair and that the state's universal service policy

is observed).
2. See generally Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 33
CPUC 2d 43 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Oct. 12, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Alternative Regulatory
Frameworks].
3. See id.
4. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., CPUC Decision 95-07-054, 163 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 155 (July 24, 1955) [hereinafter Competition for Local Exchange Servs.].
5. 1989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 115.
6. In describing its price-cap formula, the CPUC noted that it differed from a "pure price
cap model" because such a model "does not have checks and balances against potential
inaccuracies in the price cap index, [therefore] its use could cause wide swings in a utility's
earnings." Id. para. 40. That price index changes according to (1) the percentage change in
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The NRF restructured prices across different classes of service to reflect
competition in local toll services before it was present, and it reduced access
charges to long-distance carriers, both of which further reduced profitability.
The CPUC changed not only pricing policies but also entry conditions. It
increased the number of new service providers in local toll markets, using its
regulation of local toll rates to allow entrants to undercut incumbents. It
anticipated that these reductions would be offset by increases in demand,
which, however, have not been realized. As a result, the incumbents, faced
with duplicative providers of service, will find in the next few years that their
service offerings are not sustainable.
While conflicts have developed between the old and new purposes for
regulation, the new policies have had an impact, not only on the incumbent
local exchange carriers but also on market behavior in California. The
emerging issue with the new "competitiveness" policy is whether the entrants
and incumbents will continue to provide service to all comers. Even more
basic, has new competition developed that offers more service at prices in
line with the costs of providing that service? Part II surveys the foundations
of traditional regulation and the opportunities for entry of potential
competitors under the old rate and service requirements. Part III describes
the CPUC policies to create more competition within the NRF. Part IV turns
to both federal and state policies for establishing competitive long-distance
markets, in terms of both intentions and results, through mid-decade. The
last part sums up the results of the new policies for both existing and
entering carriers, and what they imply for competitiveness of markets. To
date, service quality is at risk, and competitiveness is not developing as a
consequence of the NRF.
II.

TRADITIONAL REGULATION IN CALIFORNIA

Regulatory commissions, including California's, traditionally have held
that a regulated firm should have the opportunity, but not the guarantee, to
earn a fair return on its relevant invested capital.7 The term "fair" has had

the gross domestic product (GDP) price index, minus (2) a percentage productivity factor, plus
or minus (3) the percentage change in exogenous cost factors. The formula as applied to
Category I services (primarily basic exchange services) does not allow for pricing flexibility,
but rather it establishes a fixed price. The formula for Category II services (e.g., CentraNet
and IntraLATA toll services as of January 1995) is less restrictive. It establishes the same
price cap, but allows downward pricing flexibility to a price floor, which is set equal to direct
embedded costs (or incremental costs), plus the GDP price index. Id.
7. See, e.g., PAUL W. MACAVOY, INDUSTRY REGULATION AND THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY ch. 2 (1991); see also FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,
605 (1944) (holding that regulation should set "[r]ates which enable [a] company to operate
successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its
investors for the risk assumed").
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many interpretations, but as this author has stated elsewhere, "[Public utilities
commissions] have acted on the premise that the companies should earn
returns that ma[k]e them able to compete in the capital markets for funds for
the plant and equipment necessary for the growth of [capacity required for]
service[s] to meet consumer demands. 8 That opportunity to earn the
putatively competitive return has been granted in rate proceedings based,
correctly or erroneously, on a specified level of the allowed rate of return.
That prospect for earnings has invariably been accompanied by requirements
to provide universal and high-quality service as the "supplier of only (and
last) resort."9
The CPUC's policy in California has been to grant the local exchange
carriers the opportunity to earn a fair return on prudent investments, given
that they, too, have accepted broad based service obligations. In 1995, the
CPUC restated its position regarding its policy, holding that local competition
"rules should not go so far as to unconstitutionally deprive the local exchange
carriers of the opportunity to earn a fair return on invested capital."' 10
However, the CPUC also took the position that in an increasingly competitive
environment, cost-based regulation was not operational since it disallowed
local exchange carriers the opportunity to respond to price initiatives of other
suppliers. The CPUC further acknowledged that "traditional regulation creates
a set of incentives which do not result in efficient management and cost
containment," thereby, undermining the incumbent's ability to compete."
But in this context, the service obligations placed upon local exchange
carriers continue. With "universal" coverage as the goal, rural households
have to be subsidized by earnings from toll and urban business services.
This internal transfer of earnings cannot be sustained when businesses switch
to entrants providing only specialized service. The CPUC acknowledged,
"Historically, the emphasis in rate design [has been] on a system of
contributions above embedded costs from certain services, notably toll, to the
system's revenue requirements so that basic service rates could be kept below
their embedded costs in order to promote our universal service goals."' 2
Cross-subsidization has been so extensive as to provide significant incentives
8. MACAVOY, supra note 7, at 30. This characterization of the general policy and
practice of public utilities commissions has been documented in textbooks on regulation,
judicial decisions, and articles in scholarly economic and legal journals. See, e.g., ALFRED
E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1970); C.
PILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES ch. 9 (1993); DANIEL SPULBER,

REGULATION AND MARKETS (1989).
9. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ch. 21 (1994); KAHN, supra note 8; PAUL W. MACAvOY, THE REGULATED
INDUSTRIES AND THE ECONOMY (1979).
10. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 155.
11. 1989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 130.
12. Id. at 93.
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for selective entry of specialized carriers.
Traditionally, the incumbent local exchange carrier opposed the entry of
competitors into only certain lines of business, arguing that the financial
contribution from those services was necessary to finance the continued
provision of basic exchange service. One author estimated that "[by] the
mid-i 970s, local access and usage charges were [covering] two-thirds of the
direct costs of providing those services, while long-distance rates were twice
the direct costs of those services."13 Within California, by the mid-1990s,
revenues from local exchange usage still covered only two-thirds of direct
operating and capital costs of that service; Pacific Bell's direct (incremental)
costs of service ranged from $19 to $33 per month, depending on length and
number of lines, while rates generated revenues ranging from $14 to $21 per
month (Table One).
TABLE ONE
NUMBER OF LINEs VS. CABLE LENGTH

Number of Lines
Cable Length
(ft)

10,533 to 21,065

21,065 to 31,598

31,598 to 42,131

A. Operating and Capital Cost ($/Line/Month)
6,000
8,000
11,000
14,000
17,000

23.54
25.62
25.40
30.36
31.88

19.05
24.84
27.87
26.33
28.79

19.75
21.07
24.13
30.14
28.46

20,000

34.03

37.36

33.20

B. Revenue ($/Line/Month)
6,000
8,000
11,000
14,000
17,000

20.75
20.75
13.97
20.75
20.75

13.97
20.75
20.75
13.97
20.35

13.97
13.97
13.97
20.75
13.97

Source: Pacific Bell's Cost Proxy ModelUniversal Service Ed. (Apr. 5, 1996)14

13. J. Rohlfs, Economically Efficient Bell System Pricing, AT&T's Submission to
Congressman T. Van Deerlin, Attachment H (Oct. 31, 1978).
14. The Cost Proxy Model extrapolates the number of lines (line density) and distances
from 968 local exchange carrier, wire centers (cable length) throughout the entire state of
California, based on data within Pacific Bell's service territory. Using a demographic database
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Telephone regulation, split between state agencies and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), brought about this structure of prices.
Regulated prices for local exchange services could not be equal to direct
costs for those services. The last allocation scheme developed by the
regulators over time had assigned ever larger shares of local exchange costs
to long-distance services, thereby preventing increases in prices for local
exchange services.1 5 This scheme went so far as to keep local exchange
prices below the direct costs of providing residential service. According to
Pacific Bell, until the early 1990s, "[a] complex system of subsidies from one
geographic area to another and from certain services to other services has
16
permitted the Commission to price residential access service below cost.

compiled by Bamberg-Handley, Pacific Bell's consultants, INDETEC Int'l, first derived
Residence conversion ratios (1.175 R-square 90%) and Daytime Population to Business Line
conversion ratios (0.05 R-square 90%), relating population, income, ethnic, and other
demographic data to Pacific Bell density and residence line counts within its service area.
Using CPUC Telephone Exchange maps for wire centers outside Pacific Bell's region, these
conversion ratios were then applied to estimate the distance from the centroid of each grid to
its wire center and the square mileage of the grid, allowing for the completion of the table
with estimated data for the rest of the state.
OperatingExpense Estimates. Due to the wide variation in California local exchange
carrier size (from 190 lines to 17 million lines), expenses per line exhibit large variation.
Using ARMIS data, a statewide weighted average expense per access line was calculated
(excluding depreciation expense). A factor for each local exchange carrier's total expense per
access line compared to Pacific Bell's total expense per access line was developed from the
ARMIS reports for 1993. Combining the statewide average expense per line with the actual
Pacific Bell Operating Expense data, statewide average values were generated. The ratios
from ARMIS for each company were then applied to the statewide average numbers to
estimate a particular company's operating expenses. Pacific Bell's factor is 0.93, to reflect
a lower than average cost.
Switch Locations and Cost. To estimate switch costs, Pacific Bell began by using the
January 1996 Local Exchange Routing Guide to obtain switch address, technology type, and
carrier for each wire center. Matchmaker software was used to convert the address to latitude
and longitude, with the V and H coordinates used if Matchmaker could not assign the latitude
and longitude. Approximately 10% of the wire centers did not geocode in Matchmaker, so
the V and H values were converted to latitude and longitude based on Bellcore algorithms.
Technology type was analyzed to ensure that only digital switches were used. Analog
switches were replaced with expected digital counterparts. Cost characteristics from Pacific
Bell's SCIS runs of the digital switches included: DMS-100, DMS Remote, 5ESS, and 5ESS
remote. If a switch technology did not match the switch choices mentioned, then a substitute
was made (GTE Tel Ops indicated their GT5 and GTR switches have DMS cost characteristics). If the cost characteristics of a switch technology could not be determined, then a DMS100 switch was assumed.
15. See Economic Implications and Interrelationships Arising from Policies and Practices
Relating to Customer Interconnection, Jurisdictional Separations and Rate Structures, 61
F.C.C. 2d 766, 768 para. 2 (1976) (stating that "[t]he telephone industry... contends that socalled 'specialized' services ... presently generate revenues substantially in excess of their
direct costs, which help to defray overall system costs and thus to maintain low rates for basic
telephone services").
16. Response of Pacific Bell (U 1001 C) to Administrative Law Judge's Ruling
EstablishingProcedurefor Considerationof IntraLATA Equal Access, 1.87-11-033, at 9 (July
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Over the years, the CPUC's decisions on rate structure have supported
this transfer of earnings from toll for the purpose of covering the costs of
basic exchange.' 7 The CPUC acknowledged that this transfer was a
financial burden on incumbent local carriers, at least when the source of
earnings declined due to emerging competition.' 8 The incumbents'
price-cost margins on local toll services were maintained at high levels in
order to provide the cash flow to support this transfer; they became natural
targets for entry by firms providing new long-distance services. In addition,
entry was made more attractive where new technology lowered costs, for
example, where it became less costly for carriers to bypass a local exchange
carrier's switches so that they could offer both access and toll services
directly to customers.
The structure of rates that evolved in California as a consequence
included rates offering both high and nonexistent earnings margins. But the
general pattern was that margins on intraLATA toll services and some
vertical services generated disproportionate earnings relative to minutes of
use. 19 In 1995, Pacific Bell stated that
a vast majority of our toll revenue is generated by a small number
of geographically concentrated customers. . . . Twenty percent of
our business customers generate seventy-five percent of our business
toll revenue; twenty-five percent of our residence customers generate
seventy-five percent of our residence toll revenue.. . . Our revenues
are geographically concentrated (one percent of our serving area
produces forty-nine percent of our business usage revenue) and are
generated by a small number of customers (eighteen percent of
business locations account for eighty percent of business usage
volumes).20
Margins on local exchange calls have been at zero or at negative levels
(Table One) so that basic local exchange services have not generated earnings
on operations. But vertical services, including call forwarding, have had
margins that generate earnings, and toll services also have been able to
generate substantial earnings.
This "disoriented" rate structure clearly has created an incentive for
focused entry into local toll service. Not only do the relatively high margins

31, 1995) [hereinafter Response of Pacific Bell].
17. See Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 56 CPUC 2d
117 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Sept. 15, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Alternative Regulatory
Frameworks].
18. See id. at 40.
19. See id. at 117.

20. Response of Pacific Bell, supra note 16, at 9.
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earned by local exchange carriers on the provision of such services generate
cash flows that cover system joint costs, but they also provide high profit
opportunities for entrants without system joint costs. There are also
embedded in local exchange carriers' geographic rate structures disoriented
margins, with high margins on low-cost (generally urban) local exchange and
low or negative margins on high-cost (generally rural) customers. These
differential margins have to encourage selective regional entry targeted to
locations where customers pay rates generating high margins.
An effective response by local exchange carriers to these new conditions
was constrained by their continuing obligation to provide the services
elsewhere. Local exchange carriers were required to provide local exchange
to all customers seeking service in their franchise areas. 2 1 The CPUC's rule
regarding an entrant's obligation has been that it must serve customers in its
(own) designated service territory. That territory need not be the same for
entrants as for incumbents.22 A de novo entrant that designs its service
territory to avoid high-cost customers leaves the local exchange carrier with
the obligation to serve such customers, specifically in that more sparsely
populated part of the region outside of the entrant's service territory. The
local exchange carrier has this supplier of-last-resort responsibility until the
CPUC makes a decision otherwise. 23 The CPUC must have capacity in
place to serve those customers who leave the entrant, but the entrant does not
have a reciprocal service obligation. Such requirements impose extra costs
and thus the necessity for (allowed) higher prices on local exchange carriers
consistent with the continued exclusivity of the service franchise.
III.

COMMISSION-DRIVEN COMPETITIVE OPPORTUNITIES

Two reports on market conditions and traditional regulation spurred the
CPUC to undertake basic changes in the way it regulated carriers in markets
for telecommunications services. The first report, issued by Pacific Bell in
1985, was entitled, "Charting a Sustainable Regulatory Course in Telecommunications," and concluded that local exchange markets were becoming
open to incursions from other sources of supply or from the bypass of
services.24
When a separate CPUC-sponsored report confirmed this
conclusion, the CPUC held an en banc hearing, which resulted in the Order
Instituting Investigation (Oil) 1.87-11-033.25
This order began a
wide-ranging proceeding intended to develop alternatives to cost of service
21. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) app.
A § 4(F)(1), at 155.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 5(A).
24. Response of Pacific Bell, supra note 16, at 3.
25. 1989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 43.
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regulation that "hamess[ed] competitive forces for the benefit of all
ratepayers. ' '26 It was divided into three distinct phases. Phase I examined
local exchange carrier services to determine which were "sufficiently
competitive to warrant some pricing flexibility. '27 Phase II proceeded to
terminate cost of service regulation for Pacific Bell and GTE California, and
replaced it in the NRF with price "caps" or ceilings set in place for regulated
services for predetermined periods.28 Phase III considered issues material
to the opening of intraLATA toll markets and resulted in the Implementation
of Rate Design (IRD) Proceeding that was to rebalance the rate structure of
the incumbent carriers.2 9
In November 1993, before it finalized the IRD, the CPUC submitted a
report to Governor Wilson entitled, "Enhancing California's Competitive
Strength: A Strategy for Telecommunications Infrastructure." The report
advocated opening local exchange markets to entrants by January 1997. 3
Largely as a result of this recommendation, the California Legislature passed
Assembly Bill 3606, which provided the CPUC with a mandate to open local
exchange markets to entrants who would either resell or duplicate the
capacity of the networks of the incumbent regulated carriers. 3 1 The CPUC
adopted the Initial Rules on Local Competition in July 1995, allowing
competitive local carriers to provide local exchange service by reselling
incumbent services as early as January 1996 and facilities-based services by
March 1996.32 This sequence of decisions is shown in Chart One as
1.95-07-054.
After initiating these proceedings concerning local entry, the CPUC
created another docket to consider the effects of entry on its requirements for
universal service. 33 The responsibilities of carrier of-last-resort still
remained with the incumbent local exchange providers.34 The issue of how
this service requirement should be changed in the face of multiple providers
had been raised repeatedly during the CPUC's local entry proceedings. The
definition of universal service, its funding in a competitive environment, and
the assignment of responsibility were all at issue. The July 1995 CPUC
decision issued interim rules that, significantly, maintained the local exchange

26. Response of Pacific Bell, supra note 16, at 6.
27. Id. at 7.
28. 1989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 59.
29. 1994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC 2d at 117.
30. Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 58 CPUC 2d 392,
392 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Dec. 21, 1994).
31. 1994 Cal. Stat. 1260.
32. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 155.
33. Universal Service and to Comply with the Mandates of Assembly Bill 3643, Decision
95-07-050 (July 19, 1995).
34. Id. app. A § 6(D)(1).
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carrier obligation as last source of service. 35 On other important dimensions, regulation has not diminished. Although the CPUC claimed its
"strategy relies principally on the discipline and capital of private markets
and investors, 3 6 it retained oversight of all financial decisions of the
incumbent carriers in local telecommunications markets. Indeed, the
expansion of rulings surrounding the "opening" of markets involved the
CPUC more than ever in managing the incumbent companies.
Chart One
The Sequence of California Regulatory Proceedings

(O

D. 884-84)4
(Consolidated
HeoPnge for D. 88-09-059
Pacific & GTE)
(Phase1)

En Banc Hearings
(August 11. 1987)
Reform Options
1.87-11-033
Starting 3 PhaseReform)

1

89-11'-431
(Pluo II - NRF)

D. 90-44466
(Poliy Guide
for PhaseIII)

D. 91-074)44
(Pokty Guidefor
Issa Needing
Resoution efore
Phase lIl)

D. 93-194)38
(GTEC
Settleent)

I

D. 93-094476
(IRD)
*R-ir.Ildd

Reportto the
Governor
(11/93)

D. 944)6411
(Modified NRF)
D.94-12-053
(ProceduralPlanfor OpeningLocalEachauge by 1/97)

D.95-01-021
(Universal Service)
D.954)7-05)
(ProposedRules)

I 9544044
(Local Ciupetition)
1. 954174454
(Iniial Rules)

D. 94-19465
(IRD Phas i1)

I. 95-04147
(NRF Refoorn)

Source: As explained in the text

35. Id. at 86.
36. CALIFORNIA PUB. UTrL. COMM'N, ENHANCING CALIFORNIA'S COMPETITIVE
STRENGTH: A STRATEGY FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE, at viii (1993).
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A.

The New Regulatory Framework

The NRF introduced a form of "incentive regulation" 3' 7 for Pacific Bell
and GTE California that combined a price cap process with a sharing
mechanism.3 In the NRF Decision, the CPUC divided local exchange
carrier services into three categories, with each allowed a different degree of
pricing flexibility.39 Prices for Category I services, termed "monopoly
building blocks," are set by, and cannot be changed except by, CPUC
proceedings.40 Category II services include those the CPUC found to have
sufficient "competitiveness" to allow the local exchange carrier downward
pricing flexibility (to a minimum of direct embedded cost). 4 1 Services taken
out of the regulatory review, such as directory advertising, were placed in
Category II to be priced with the "maximum pricing flexibility allowed by
42

law."

A price cap formula determined the individual rates for Category I
services and set upper price boundaries for Category II services. The formula
is as follows:
R(1)=R(-,)x[1 +I-X±ZIR]
where R(t) is the rate index or price level to be effective on January 1 of the
upcoming year; R(t-1) the rate index or price level effective on December 31
of the present year; I the percentage change in inflation measured by the
percentage change in gross domestic product price index 43 from July 1 of
the past year to June 30 of the current year; X the difference between "total
factor productivity growth rates in the telecommunications industry and the
economy as a whole";" Z the annualized dollar effect of authorized
recovery of exogenous cost changes; and R the annualized total revenues to
scale Z.45 Since the CPUC intended the last term to apply only in very
limited circumstances, such as when changes in federal and state tax laws
"disproportionately" affect local exchange carriers,46 the formula essentially

37. For a full discussion of incentive regulation, see RONALD BRAEUTIGAM & JORDAN
J. HILMAN, PRICE LEVEL REGULATION FOR DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILITIES (1989).
38. 1989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 43.
39. Id. at 125.

40. Id. at 124-25.
41. Id. at 125.

42. Id.
43. Originally, the CPUC used GNP-PI but changed to GDP-PI in the first Triennial
Review.
44. 1989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 154.
45. Id. at 162.
46. Id. at 137.
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adjusted rates each year by the economy-wide rate of inflation, minus the
industry's excess productivity growth rate.
Regulation by price caps has been heralded for its ability to provide
regulated entities with incentives to operate efficiently. Given these
predictable limits on prices, the carrier can increase earnings by reducing
costs by more than that given by industry productivity growth. For the cap
to provide such incentives, however, the regulator must both set the inflation
and productivity factors correctly and then credibly commit to the price that
follows the formula. Should the regulator opportunistically adjust the
formula to reduce profitability after the fact, the incentives to cut costs
disappear. For example, if the regulator increases the productivity offset
whenever a regulated company earns large profits, the firm will undertake
only the most profitable cost-reducing projects.
In fact, the most contentious issue in the proceedings, leading to adoption
of the price cap formula, was the estimate of the productivity factor. The
CPUC purposely left the estimation of the Z factor open-ended because of the
inherent difficulty in predicting "factors which could affect utility costs to an
'
extent warranting explicit rate adjustments."47
Most parties agreed that
inflation should be measured by the gross domestic product price index.48
Since the price cap level was determined then, essentially, by the productivity
factor, the choice of the value for that factor was critical. Small changes in
factor levels could cause large changes in allowed revenues; for Pacific Bell,
a percentage point increase in the productivity level using the cap formula
increased revenues from $40 million to $70 million per year (Table Two).
TABLE Two
IMPACT OF CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY FACTOR ON COMPANY REVENUE

(Dollars in Millions)
1993

1994

1995

Average

Dollar impact from one percentage
point change in productivity factor
assuming a demand elasticity of-0.2

69.30

70.70

71.70

70.56

Dollar impact from one percentage
point change in productivity factor
assuming a demand elasticity of -0.5

42.20

43.30

43.13

42.90

Note: Numbers derived using CPUC price cap formula assuming that all services were provided
at average price, for all services under regulation, and demand changed only in response to price
movements.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 43.
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The NRF proceedings considered estimates of productivity increase
within the range of 1.7% to 6.0% per annum (Table Three). Witnesses for
Pacific Bell and GTE California endorsed estimates from 1.7% to 2.5%,
based on historical data (Table Three). Other parties such as AT&T and the
CPUC's Division of Ratepayers Advocates proposed that a "productivity
target" be adopted at much higher levels.49 The CPUC rejected the local
exchange carriers' studies and endorsed the concept of a productivity factor
as a target level:
The adopted productivity target is set at a "stretch" level somewhat
in excess of productivity levels we judge to be reasonably expected
on an industry wide basis absent incentive regulation. Thus, while
the correspondence will not be exact for a given utility at a given
time, as a general matter over a period of years, we expect that the
developed price cap indexing approach will lead to lower rates than
would have occurred under the traditional ratemaking approach."0
The initial productivity factor term in the formula was set at 4.5% for
1990-1993 (Table Three). Despite studies and testimony presented by Pacific
Bell and others arguing the 4.5% level could not be achieved, the CPUC
raised the productivity factor to 5.0% for 1994 and 1995, finding the 4.5%
figure insufficient to "reflect the 'stretch factor'" it had intended.5 But in
the most recent proceeding, under the NRF, the CPUC reversed its stretch
policy by setting the productivity factor equal to the inflation rate, thus
instituting a price freeze on Pacific Bell and GTE California (Table Three).
But as a supplement to the price cap formula, the CPUC created a
"sharing mechanism" for what it termed "excess" earnings of the local
exchange carriers' shareholders, with the excess going to ratepayers as further
price reductions.5 2 The CPUC adopted an acceptable market-based rate of
return on assets, a benchmark rate 1.5 percentage points higher, and a ceiling
rate 5.0 percentage points above the market return rate. 3 Within this range,
the utilities would retain all profits when below the benchmark return rate,
refund to ratepayers half of earnings between the benchmark rate and the
earnings cap,54 and return all profits above the ceiling rate. 5 The market
rate was originally set at 11.5%, then lowered to 10.0 % in 1994.56

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 158.
Id. at 152.
GTE California, Inc., 55 CPUC 2d 1, 42 (Cal. Pub. Util. Conim'n June 8, 1994).
Id. at 140.
Id.
This changed in the first Triennial Review.
Id.
Id.
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TABLE THREE
PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATES ADVOCATED IN THE NRF PROCEEDING (%)

CPUC
Productivity
Estimate

Study

Adopted
Value
1994

Adopted
Value
1995

Adopted
Value
1996

5.0

5.0'

Equal to
Inflation

5.0-6.0

Selwyn
(CBCHA) 1

3.5-5.0

AT&T 2
Div. of Ratepayer
4
Advocates
FCC Adopted

Endorsed
Estimate
1991-1993

6

Hausman
(Pacific Bell)'

4.5

4.55

3.0
2.0-2.5
1.7-2.1

Schankerman
(GTEC)8
Sources:

11989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 158.
1d.

2
3

GTE California, Inc., 55 CPUC 2d at 2.

'1989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 158.

'Id.

6Md.
7

1d.
'Id. at 136.

These two policies together were not consistent with the goals of price
cap regulation. Sharing mechanisms contradict the incentive basis for price
caps. By reducing the potential returns from cost cutting, they reduce the
case for operating more efficiently. Furthermore, there is the potential for
opportunistic behavior by the CPUC: "Ifearnings reach [above the earnings
cap] for two consecutive years, we would expect to initiate an investigation
into whether the productivity factor should be modified. 57 In effect, this
two-pronged program failed to promote "relentless innovation" or "facilitate
experimentation."5 8 More basic, regardless of the goals, its impact on the
largest regulated carrier, Pacific Bell, has been substantially negative. The
price cap mechanism, by anticipating large annual increases in productivity,

57. 1989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 140.
58. CALIFORNIA PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 36, at 7.
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reduced rates by as much as $160 million per year (Table Four). These rate
reductions were not matched by equally large cost savings. Instead, falling
rates and falling earnings margins undermined the financial position of the
largest incumbent local exchange carrier in California. Recognizing this new
condition, the CPUC in its Second Triennial Review of the NRF suspended
the use of "inflation minus productivity" in the price cap formula for 1996
through 1998." 9 While a price freeze slows the hemorrhaging of Pacific
Bell's revenues, it, in turn, demolishes the logic of the price cap procedure.
TABLE FOUR
PACIFIC BELL REVENUE REDUCTIONS AND COST SAVINGS

(Dollars in Millions)
1991

1992

1993

Revenue changes due to
price cap reductions
relative to previous year

-14'

-132

-12'

Cost changes relative to
previous year

+378

-237

+1,862

1994a

-854
-1,703

19958

-161'
+0

Sources: All figures are from Pacific Bell 10K Filings.
'PACIFIC BELL, FORM 10K SEC 24 (1990).
2Id. at 8.
3

1d. at 10.

4

1d.

5

1d. at 8.

Note: Revenue changes due to rate and cost reductions include only changes due to the price cap
formula; cost is in nominal terms.
'Productivity factor was raised to 5% for 1994 and 1995.

B.

Implementation of Rate Design

The next phase of regulatory restructuring centered on opening local toll
markets to new carriers that would duplicate the systems of Pacific Bell and
GTE. The CPUC intended to allow entrant carriers to provide local toll
service, beginning in January 1995, which was connected to the incumbent's
local network, such that the caller had to dial 10XXX to access the new
carrier (or directly connect the caller and new long-distance carriers).6 ° The
CPUC stated that it sought to enable incumbent and entrant carriers to

59. Pacific Bell Form 10K, Filing with Securities and Exchange Commission 5 (1995)
[hereinafter Form 10K].
60. 1994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC 2d at 117.
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"remain in newly competitive areas on a fair basis.'
To respond to entry and maintain a semblance of profitability, the local
exchange carriers had to be able to reduce their prices for intraLATA toll
calls. To continue to meet regulatory obligations, they had to maintain
substantial earnings from these markets. The CPUC attempted to respond
with approval of a new rate structure that met conflicting demands for
"competitive" prices from entry and "compensatory" prices from continued
incumbent service. Entry had the potential to drive local toll prices down
and erode revenues of local exchange carriers, making unlikely the continued
provision of both local exchange and local toll services under price caps. In
order to compensate local exchange carriers for such revenue losses, the
62Suhrt
Such rate
CPUC allowed them to increase rates for other services.
adjustments were to make the opening of toll markets revenue neutral.
[T]hese policies are intended neither to result in a windfall to the
NFF companies nor to deprive GTEC or Pacific of a fair opportunity
to earn a competitive rate of return. To accomplish this balancing,
every rate change ordered by this decision which results in a revenue
increase or decrease is offset by countervailing rate changes or
revenue adjustments so that the cumulative effect of all revenue
changes for each ... company is zero.63
If this rate restructuring were, in fact, revenue neutral, then the CPUC could
ensure that the local exchange carriers would be able to price their local toll
offerings competitively while continuing to earn enough to meet regulatory
"universal service" obligations. Thus, the proceedings had to estimate
accurately the impact of both decreased local toll and increased local
exchange rates on exchange carrier revenues.
The toll rate impact depended on the extent to which lower local toll
prices predictably increased demand for those services. To avoid raising
rates excessively on other services, the CPUC first had to determine the
increase in revenue the local exchange carriers would receive from expected
increases in toll service demand. 64 During the IRD proceeding, witnesses
offered estimates ranging from -0.723 to -0.270 for intraLATA toll price
elasticity of demand (Table Five). The accuracy of any of these estimates
was likely to be reduced given that the data from which they were derived
(the local residential toll prices) had been virtually constant over the decade.
Witnesses for Pacific Bell and GTE California attempted to solve this

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

19-20.
38.
3.
148.
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problem by measuring consumer responses across states to variations in
"average revenue per message" or "surcharge[s]/surcredit[s]. '' 65 The CPUC
rejected this approach: "Pacific's findings are based on data from six other
states besides California, and the studies of both GTEC and Pacific are not
premised on consumer response to changes in price."
TABLE FIvE
WITNESS ESTIMATES OF PRICE ELASTICITY OF
DEMAND FOR INTRALATA TOLL CALLS AND CPUC ENDORSEMENTS

IntraLATA Toll
Elasticities

Study
Gatto
(CBCHA/County)'

-0.723

Div. of Ratepayers
Advocates 2

-0.600

Zona and Jacob
(FCC Adopted)3

-0.470

6

-0.384

Duncan (GTEC)

Hausman (Pacific)
Taylor (Pacific)7

-0.270

Average

-0.489

CPUC Endorsed

Post IRD

-0.54

-0.2'

Sources: Duncan & Perry, IntraLATA Toll Demand Modeling: A Dynamic Analysis of Revenue
and Usage Data, INF. ECON. POL'Y 6 (1994).
'1994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC 2d at 149.
2

1d.

3

1d. at 152-54.

4

1d.

'Author's calculations from additions from 1995-1996 to the data series; inclusive of 1OXXX
calls over entrants' systems.

61994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC 2d at 155.
7

1d. at 149.

Witnesses for opposing parties in the proceeding offered numerical
estimates of elasticity that invariably were larger. These studies did not limit
their data to California local toll series, but instead used both local and
interLATA toll series.67 Although Pacific Bell and GTE California argued
that these studies were not relevant because demand for interLATA "calling

65. Id. at 150-51.
66. Id. at 154-55.
67. Id. at 153.
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is inherently more elastic than for intraLATA toll calling, 68 the CPUC held
that they had not "conclusively demonstrated" this claim.69 Ultimately, the
CPUC found the higher estimates persuasive and used a price elasticity of
demand of -0.5 in calculating the increases in revenue the local exchange
carriers would receive from lower local toll prices.7 ° As studies performed
after the IRD went into effect would later confirm, -0.5 was a significant
overestimate of the price elasticity of demand for local toll services. The
actual increase in revenues, relative to that forecast by the CPUC, was far
less than was forecast based on -0.5 elasticities. The financial impact of the
mistake was a reduction in Pacific Bell's revenues by more than $600 million
to be rebalanced by local exchange rate increases of less than $400 million
(Table Six).
TABLE SIX
CHANGE IN PACIFIC BELL REVENUE FROM 1994 TO 1995

(Dollars in Millions)

Local service

Price
Rebalancing

Price Cap
Orders

Misc.

379

-125

79

24

357

Customer
Demand

Total Change
from 1994

Network access
Interstate
Intrastate

20
-213

Toll service

-616

-48

-53

-57

-774

15

-1

25

76

115

-415

-237

129

318

-205

Other
Total

Source: PACIFIC TELESIS, FORM 10K, SEC (1995).

The CPUC opened local "toll and toll like services" to entry beginning
January 1, 1995 and moved these services to Category II for price cap
regulation.71 In the year immediately following the decision, Pacific Bell
experienced a net reduction of $205 million in operating revenues. The $318
million increase from market growth, at an expansive stage in the state
business cycle, did not offset the $415 million decrease caused by rate
rebalancing. In one year, toll service revenues, as a source of Pacific Bell's
total revenues, fell from 21% to only 12%.72 The after-the-fact explanation

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.at 152.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 4.
Form 10K, supra note 59, at 3.
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has been that Pacific Bell lost local toll share to "interexchange carriers who
have the competitive advantage of being able to offer these services both
within and between service areas. 73 Far from being revenue neutral, the
decision added to the losses Pacific Bell was already experiencing from
annual price cap rate reductions.
The financial markets reacted strongly to these results. In March 1995,
Moody's Investors Services placed the "long-term debt rating of [Pacific
Bell] under review for possible downgrade. 74 Duff and Phelps lowered
Pacific Bell's bond rating in May 1995, citing as reasons "price cap revenue
reductions, toll services competition, and proposed interim rules on local
services competition. ' 75 Standard and Poor's, in August 1995, stated that
the "long term rating outlook for [Pacific Bell] is negative. 76 The most
significant market reaction to the CPUC's new regulation, however, was yet
to come.
What was lost by the incumbent carriers was to be made up in the policy
benefits calculation by gains to consumers from an outbreak in local toll
competition. Local toll competition was supposed to reduce toll charges to
consumers to levels in line with carriers' marginal costs of providing those
services. Curiously, the CPUC's position was that "we favor competition
whenever sufficient conditions exist" and "we believe opening the LATAs
to competition will stimulate new services and technologies .... , There
was not a word of promise that entrants in toll markets would reduce prices.
That was because prices for local toll were sharply reduced, prematurely, by
the CPUC in the IRD rate restructuring. In 1993 and 1994, average revenue
per toll call decreased from 48 cents per minute to 45 cents per minute. The
IRD procedure required this to be reduced to 25 cents per minute in 1995,
just before local toll markets were opened up to the provision of service by
the interLATA carriers.7 8 These carriers did not exert strong new initiatives
to reduce prices further, obviously because they could not compete and take
away market share, given subscribers' very limited options for switching their
services (because subscribers had to dial 1OXXX to receive the entrant's local
toll dial tone). In fact, the most important entrants, the large interstate
long-distance carriers, did not succeed in gaining more than 10% of local toll
minutes in California during the first year.
Even so, the lack of any competitive response to the new CPUC policy

73. Id. at 26.
74. Id. at 31.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 1994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC 2d at 25.
78. CPUC, Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, Decision 95-09-126 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n Sept. 27, 1995).
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across the state did not apply on all services. There were entrant incursions
into specialized markets. Pacific Bell's share of business interLATA toll fell
from 56.6% to 48.1% from mid-1995 to mid-1996; its share of inbound
WATS intraLATA toll fell from 23.8% to 15.4%, and it lost nine percentage
points from 63.9% to 54.9% in outbound WATS intraLATA toll share.7 9
These incumbents' shares were already low because business subscribers had
equipment to automatically dial 1OXXX and had been offered packaged local
and interLATA 800-service by the interstate long-distance carriers prior to
the new competitiveness initiative that could not be matched by the in-state
toll carriers. The incumbent local carriers' further loss in shares was not
followed by their cutting prices, so even here the manifestations of leveraging
competition have not been realized.
Across the State of California, the CPUC's initiatives to make local toll
markets competitive have accomplished little since the beginning of 1995.
They have fostered the entry of long-distance carriers into markets for
in-LATA long-distance services, but that has changed neither the market
structure nor price for these services. The exception has been in the
high-volume business services, concentrated in the largest cities, where
entrants' shares have begun to exceed half of the volume of service offered.
Only business, with the largest volume, has seen such a "competitive" effect
and that has not been accompanied by price reductions one associates with
the presence of more carriers.
C. ProposedRules for Local Competition
The 1993 report to Governor Wilson recommended that local exchange
markets be opened for services from new carriers by January 1, 1997.80
The legislative mandate provided by Assembly Bill 3606 affirmed that goal,
and the CPUC began formal hearings concerning local exchange entry in
April 1995. The CPUC went one year better by announcing in its Order
Instituting Investigation for Local Competition that it would open the markets
for local exchange services on January 1, 1996.2 Both GTE California and
Pacific Bell stated that before these markets were opened, other issues such
as universal service provision and productivity factor estimation had to be
resolved. They noted that an acceleration of entry would disrupt the

79. Pacific Bell Application for Authority under Section 271 of the Communications Act
to Provide In-Region InterLATA Service in the State of California: Brief in Support of
Application 27 (FCC 1997) [hereinafter Pacific Bell Application].
80. See generally CALIFORNIA PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, supra note 36.
81. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., Interim Order 95-04-044 (Apr. 26, 1995)
(order instituting on the CPUC's own motion investigation into competition for Local
Exchange Service).
82. Id. at 15.
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progression of the "sequential steps" which the CPUC had agreed must be
83
"timed and coordinated" in implementing a policy of local competition.
Even interest groups that frequently opposed the local exchange carriers in
hearings, such as the Division of Ratepayers Advocates, urged the CPUC to
resolve "[high] priority issues regarding unbundling of networks, number
portability, interconnection, universal service, and intraLATA equal access,"
before making local exchange service markets accessible to new carriers. 84
TABLE SEVEN
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED

SELECTIVELY ON INCUMBENT LOCAL CARRIERS

Type of Regulation

Constraints Imposed on Incumbent But Not on Entrants

Rate structure'

Incumbent has to serve high-cost areas and cannot refuse to
serve any reasonably situated customer. But competitive
local carriers have the incentive to target only low-cost customers, while limiting service to high cost customers.

Rate changes 2

Incumbent cannot change rates without tariff approval and
thus cannot respond as rapidly to changing market conditions
as competitors.

Obligation to
serve 3

Incumbent has provider of last resort responsibilities in its
service area; it must have stand-by facilities in place to serve
customers, including those who may leave a competing carier.

Price cap
implementation4

Incumbent is subject to the CPUC's Phase II NRF rules,
which do not allow pricing flexibility to meet competition in
Category I services.

Service offering
restrictions 5

Incumbent cannot offer packages that combine basic Category
I services and Category II services.

Cost reporting6

Incumbent must file cost studies to support rate changes.
This imposes compliance costs and also provides rivals with
competitively sensitive cost data.

Sources:
11994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC 2d at 19.
21989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 125.
3

Competition Local Exch. Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th app. A § 5, at 155.

41989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 377 para. 10 (Concl. of Law).

51994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC 2d at 327 para. 162 (Concl. of Law).
6
1d. at 334 para. 225.

83. Id.at 17.
84. Id. at 15.
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While the CPUC concurred that there were issues in regulation of entry
that were interrelated with pricing and thus ordered further hearings, it
disagreed that local exchange entry should be delayed. Indeed, the CPUC
rejected the local exchange carriers' and the Division of Ratepayers
Advocates' arguments, stating, "We fully intend to open all markets ... to
local exchange competition in accordance with the law of the State as written
in AB 3606. We shall not entertain delay tactics aimed at derailing the
performance of our statutory duty." 5 Therefore, after hearing comments on
its proposed Order, the CPUC issued the Initial Rules for Local Competition
in July 1995.86 The Initial Rules differed little from the CPUC's own
proposals in its original Order. The service obligations placed on local
exchange carriers continued (Table Seven). The CPUC stated that the local
exchange carriers had "provider of last resort responsibilities in their service
areas," until a decision could be reached in the Universal Service Docket at
some later time.8 7 But entrants had only to provide service to all those in
their own areas, not all those in the full local exchange carrier territories 88
Entrants were free to define their service areas as they saw fit without
sharing the burden of providing universal service. Entrants, as a matter of
course, elect to serve areas that promise higher price-cost margins, such as
central business districts, and to leave lower-margin rural districts for incumbent local exchange carriers.
The potential for entrants to selectively serve high-margin, local exchange
service areas was increased by new differential pricing rules of the CPUC
(Table Eight). Price decreases offered for entrants would be approved within
five working days, while those offered to local exchange carriers would have
to wait for approval for ten to forty days for Category II services and three
years for Category I services.8 9 Given that the CPUC placed access, local
message, low-speed private line, operator, and "other local" services in
90 entrants into
Category 1,
the local exchange effectively would have a
three-year grace period before incumbent local exchange carriers could
respond to their introductory prices. Furthermore, price increases by entrants
would become effective not more than thirty days after the entrants file with
the CPUC. 91 And incumbent local exchange carriers could not raise prices

85. Id. at 16.
86. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 155.
87. Id. app. A § 5.
88. Id. app. A § 4(F)(1).
89. Id. app. A § 4(E)(1)(4).
90. 1989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 126. In providing 96-03020, the CPUC moved these services to Category II, but no price floors have been set, to date,
so that price flexibility is still lacking.
91. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) app.
A § 4(E)(2).
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on services not subject to entry offerings at all, unless the CPUC adjusted the
price cap mechanism in a Triennial Review.9"
Therefore, the local exchange carriers can do little under the current
system to respond to spur entry in local exchange markets. Long-distance
carriers such as AT&T or MCI are free to enter local exchange markets with
high price-cost margins and set their prices below the rates local exchange
carriers are allowed to offer so as to siphon away the profitable business. In
response, the local exchange carriers wait for the next Triennial Review to
readjust their prices or rates to meet this entry. They must take the
maximum market-share reduction while prices remain above competitive
levels. The paradox is in the resulting level of prices. New entrants have an
incentive to lower prices below local exchange carrier rates only to the level
offering the most profitable market share. Since the rates on services
attractive to entrants are well above competitive levels,93 even inefficient
entrants will succeed in local exchange markets, by offering the most limited
price reductions. So, higher cost entrants can successfully price above their
costs but with that price still be below regulated, local exchange carrier rates.
There may be many entrants, but no driving force towards a "competitive"
price.
Such potential price effects of entry became a contentious issue with
incumbents. The CPUC had granted the local carriers franchise rights to
exclusive provision of local exchange services. By opening local markets to
competition, it effectively revoked these franchise rights. The local carriers
responded that the CPUC could not alter only part of the franchise
agreement, for example, the exclusive territorial coverage, without also
reviewing the accompanying obligations to provide service of-last-resort.
GTE California argued that the NRF still assumes local exchange carrier
status as "monopoly provider[s] of local service," 94 and if the CPUC did not
allow it compensation for the loss of franchise, then opening the local
exchange to competition would constitute an arbitrary taking of property in
violation of the U.S. Constitution." Estimating the financial harm that
Pacific Bell and GTE California would suffer from loss of their exclusive
local service franchises became important in proceeding down the path of
regulatory change. In subsequent proceedings, estimates of significant
damage for Pacific Bell were presented that the initial rules would leave the
company unable to recover $5.7 billion in past investments.9 6

92. Id.at 390 4.
93. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 155.
94. Id.

95. Id.
96. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the CPUC's Own Motion into Competition for Local
Exch. Servs., Decision 96-09-089, at 3 (CPUC Sept. 20, 1996) (testimony of Peter A. Darbee).
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TABLE EIGHT
INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN REGULATIONS

Price Change

Entrant

Incumbent

Decreases

Effective on
5 working days'
notice'

Category I: Rates are determined by
the existing price cap formula, with
annual changes according to specific
inflation and productivity indices.
Incumbent can request changes in the
price cap mechanism once every
3 years.
Category II: Effective on 10 days'
notice if price floor exists; 40-day
Advice Letter if price floor not on
file. 3

Minor
increases

Effective on
>_5 working days'
notice4

Category I: Rates are determined by
the existing price cap formula, with
annual changes according to specific
inflation and productivity indices.
Incumbent can request changes in the
price cap mechanism once every
3 years.
Category II: Effective on 30 days'
notice if below price ceiling. Application required to raise ceiling.6

Major
increases

Effective on
30 days' notice7

Category I: Rates are determined by
the existing price cap formula, with
annual changes according to specific
inflation and productivity indices.
Incumbent can request changes in the
price car mechanism once every
3 years.
Category II: Effective on 30 working
days' notice if below price ceiling.
Application required to raise ceiling.9

Sources:
'Competition for Local Exch. Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th app. A § 4(E)(1), at
21989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 377 para. 10 (concl. of law).
3

1d. at 390 para. 4 (interim order).

4

Competition for Local Exch. Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th app. A § 4(E)(3), at

115.
51994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC 2d at 346 para. 68 (order).
61989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 390 para. 4 (order).
7

Competition for Local Exch. Servs., (1955] 163 P.U.R. 4th app. A § 4(E)(2), at 115.

'1989 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 33 CPUC 2d at 377 para. 10 (concl. of law).
9

See id. at 390 para. 4 (order).
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TABLE NINE
PACIFIC TELESIS' STOCK PRICE REACTION

AVERAGE DAILY ABNORMAL RETURN

Variable

Probability >
It I

Coefficient

t Statistic

0.712800
0.013171
-0.008789

5.446
1.264
-0.844
-0.433
2.195
0.493
-0.462
-0.508
0.235
-1.107
-2.047
-1.538

0.0001
0.2077
0.3998

5.822
-0.947
1.311
-1.305
0.023
-0.148
-0.704
-8.668
-0.713
-1.133
1.480
-0.633

0.0001
0.3447
0.1914
0.1935
0.9817
0.8824
0.4820
0.0001
0.4766
0.2584
0.1406
0.5272

Event 1 - Interim Rules
(R2=0.2362)
S&P 500
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
April 26, 1995
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5

-0.004524
0.022988
0.005138
-0.004815
-0.005295
0.002444
-0.011538
-0.021329
-0.016158

0.6654
0.0293
0.6225
0.6444
0.6119
0.8148
0.2694
0.0419
0.1257

Event 2 - SEC Filing

(R2=0.4188)
S&P 500
-5
-4
-3
-2
JOQ Filing Date
May 15, 1995
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
Source: As described in the text.

0.791062
-0.009768
0.013467
-0.013402
0.000236
-0.001522
-0.007243
-0.089029
-0.007330
-0.011866
0.015200
-0.006542
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It is possible, without recourse to such testimony, to demonstrate the
order-of-magnitude of the impact of these regulatory changes on franchises.
Variations in returns on a company's stock at "event dates" serve as the basis
for a market assessment of these losses.9 7 Event dates are days on which
information, such as the announcement of new regulations, has an effect on
the prices investors are willing to pay for a company's common shares.
Though econometricians use different models to explain variations in prices,
and thus in investor returns, one common method is to regress variance in
returns of a company's stock by that in returns on the market portfolio, and
in a series of specific company-related variables.98 The specific variables
represent trading days around an event date and are set to one on the day
they represent and on zero, otherwise. The basic equation is as follows:
Rt=a+Rmt+YyD,+t

where R t is the return on the firm's stock in period t; Rmt is a return on the
market portfolio in the same period; D t is a dummy variable signifying the
event date; and cc, 03, and y are parameters. If a parameter estimate is
statistically significantly different from zero, then the company's stock has
experienced abnormal change in returns on that trading day. Such a result
provides evidence that the market adjusted its valuation of the company in
response to an event.
Pacific Telesis' stock returns reveal that its investors significantly
downgraded the valuation of that local carrier's assets in response to the
CPUC announcement on entry into local exchange. Because Pacific Bell is
not publicly traded, we could not directly measure returns to its stock.
However, Pacific Bell represents approximately 90% of Pacific Telesis' total
market capitalization, and therefore, it is reasonable to assume that variations
in Pacific Telesis stock returns reflect changes in valuation of equity in
Pacific Bell. This conclusion is bolstered when one considers that Pacific
Telesis is affected by CPUC regulation, only to the extent that Pacific Bell
is. Therefore, any variation in Pacific Telesis stock returns in response to
new CPUC regulation represents market revaluation of Pacific Bell.
The effects on Pacific Telesis' stock valuation are focused on two event
dates: (1) the announcement of proposed rules for local competition on April
26, 1995 and (2) the filing of the 10Q with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on May 15, 1995, detailing Pacific Bell's expected losses
from the proposed regulation. Tables Nine and Ten present the regression

97. John J. Binder, Measuring the Effects of Regulation with Stock Price Data, 16 RAND
J. ECON. 167 (1985).

98. Id.
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results. After little response in the first two days following announcement
of the proposed rules, Pacific Telesis' stock experienced abnormal declines
in returns from May 1 to May 3. The single-day decline in returns of 2.13%
on May 2 represented a loss of shareholder value equal to approximately
$275 million. The three-day loss, from May 1 through May 3 inclusive, was
more than $630 million. This was only the beginning of the market's
devaluation of Pacific Telesis.
Even more significant reductions in Pacific Telesis' valuation occurred
after the second event date. The day after Pacific Bell reported its 10Q, the
market return on Pacific Telesis' stock dropped 8.90%, representing a
capitalized loss of over $1 billion (Table Ten). The next two trading days
also showed significant drops in the returns to Pacific Telesis' stock of
0.73% and 1.19%, respectively. Total capitalized loss from the two event
dates combined equaled just under $2 billion, as shown:
Value before announcements:
Decline from first announcement:
Decline from second announcement:

$13,093,006,875
($631,640,789)
($1,336,996,214)

Whether this estimate of expected capital losses because of loss of franchise
is correct depends on whether Pacific Bell ever receives compensation for
reductions in revenues due to local exchange competition. It is only
one-third of the loss estimated by the witness for Pacific Bell; either the
investors in the company anticipated two-thirds of that amount in earlier
stock price decreases, or their assessment is less expansive. Even though the
CPUC maintained that revoking the local exchange carrier franchise did not
constitute an uncompensated property taking, it has acceded to requests for
a hearing on the matter, which eventually could lead to compensation for loss
of "opportunity" to earn a fair return on investment. 99
There is more regulatory change to come. Additional proceedings are
scheduled to determine how to price network elements ordered to be
unbundled by sections 251 and 252 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.00 Unbundling of network elements is a step in providing attachment
for entrants to existing local exchange systems. The CPUC intends to order
the local exchange carriers to price these components based on long run
incremental costs, plus or minus an add factor. 1 1 Such a course of action

99. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 155.
100. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C. (1996)).
101. 1994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC 2d at 117; Alternative Regulatory
Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 58 CPUC 2d 392 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Dec. 21,
1994).
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would further reduce local exchange carriers' earnings by denying them
existing margins on services that otherwise, they themselves would provide
at retail. The reduced revenues of these local carriers will be substantial. 02
TABLE TEN
PACIFIC TELESIS STOCK PRICE REACTION

FRANCHISE IMPACT OF LOCAL COMPETITION RULES
with 424,065,000 total shares outstanding

Gain (Loss) in
Total Market
Valuation ($)

Trading
Date

Abnormal
Return (%)

Previous Day
Share Price

1-May-95

+3

-1.15

30.875

(151,067,113)

2-May-95

+4

-2.13

30.500

(275,868,913)

3-May-95

+5

-1.62

29.875

(204,704,763)

16-May-95

+1

-8.90

29.625

(1,118,464,705)

17-May-95

+2

(83,926,704)

18-May-95

+3

(134,604,804)

Reaction Date
Interim Rules

SEC Filing

Total

-15.73

(1,968,637,003)

Source: As described in the text.

D.

Universal Service

Universal service issues have been discussed in CPUC dockets and
03
decisions from the beginning of this regulatory restructuring process.
During the IRD proceedings, the CPUC postponed considering how to fund
universal service in open-entry markets. 1 4 During the Local Competition
Proceedings, it deferred consideration of who should bear carrier of-lastresort responsibilities. 5 Finally, in January 1995, the CPUC opened the

102. Cf. Michael J. Doane et al., An Empirical Analysis of Pricing Under Sections 251 and
252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (unpublished manuscript, on file with Doane et
al.).
103. See generally Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 58
CPUC 2d at 392.
104. See generally 1994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC at 117.
105. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 155.
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docket on universal service issues, after prompting by a specific legislative
order."° The docket has focused on three major issues: (1) defining
"basic service," (2) how to maintain service "availability and affordability"
in a "competitive environment," and (3) assignment of carrier of-last-resort
responsibilities. 107
Significantly, there is no provision in the docket for discussing the link
between franchise impacts from competition and the ability to provide
universal service, however defined. Local exchange carriers argued in the
Local Competition proceedings that losses from competition would jeopardize
The CPUC responded,
their ability to continue to provide that service.'
We conclude that [Initial] rules authorizing CLCs to begin offering
facilities-based local exchange service by January 1, 1996 and resale
competition by March 1, 1996 will not jeopardize universal service
provision. We expect to issue a decision establishing a framework
in the Universal Service Proceeding in the spring of 1996 and
implementation of final rules around June 1996.... In conclusion,
parties' claims that universal service will be jeopardized by the
initiation of local competition do not convince us to delay the
adoption of [Initial] rules. °"
Hence, the CPUC, which did not address these issues, now looks to a
separate docket, but without discussion of how franchise impacts from
competition affect provision of that service.
Since local exchange carriers had been required from the inception of
regulation to be carriers of-last-resort, they had to make investments in
network capability to provide more service than was demanded from
profitable sources. With the advent of local competition, the local exchange
carriers faced the prospect of not being able to fully recover these past
investments."' These unrecovered costs have been shifted in part to other
services, to be recovered by higher rates on those other services. But given
the impact of entry into local toll and of rate restructuring, any proposal for
continuing to provide universal service must include further rate increases.
Current proposals suggest expanding the definition of basic service,
completely revamping the funding mechanism, and eventually, establishing

106. Universal Service and to Comply with the Mandates of Assembly Bill 3643, Interim
Order 95-01-021, at 2 (July 19, 1995).
107. Id.

108. Competition for Local Exchange Servs., [1955] 163 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 155.
109. Id. at 18.

110. Universal Service and to Comply with the Mandates of Assembly Bill 3643, Decision
95-07-050, 74-75 (July 19, 1995).
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a competitive auction for assigning carrier of-last-resort responsibilities. "
However, local exchange carriers are still last resort suppliers in their service
areas and will retain this status until an entrant requests and receives approval
to offer replacement services." 2 The local exchange carriers continue to
serve as the network, but losses imposed by the rate cap mechanism, from
the opening of local toll markets and from impending entry into local
exchange, make the continued obligation a burden, which they may not be
able to undertake in the future.
By CPUC decree, local exchange markets have been open to duplicative
entry only since January 1996. But duplicative supply of certain selective
local services has been eroding the position of the incumbent franchised
companies since 1984. "Competitive Access Providers" (CAP) have taken
calls off subscriber-owned local loops or switches and transported them
mostly to the long-distance carrier's switches. Their capacity has been
embedded in fiber optic rings encircling downtown areas, as they have
targeted commercial complexes to offer business transport and recently,
services to large-scale users of telecommunications. They have been
responsible for more than 40% of the high-capacity traffic in Los Angeles
and San Francisco and for 20% in San Diego and Sacramento, but for only
7% in suburban Orange County." 3 Similar to 800 services, CAP services
have become established contrary to the exclusivity privileges of the local
exchange franchise because they were viewed as an adjunct to unregulated
services, that is, those self-provided by final consumers. While the
unregulated service providers were the subscribers who put in their own local
exchange systems, CAPs expanded to provide switching of local highcapacity services for the long-distance carriers. Most of the expansion has
taken place in the last three years so that CAPs have emerged recently from
trunk transporters to local exchange service providers to high-capacity
business subscribers.
Given these conditions, the state was a patchwork of duplicative local
exchange providers in the central cities and single providers in the suburbs
and rural areas. In the first year of open-entry, close to ninety companies
filed with the CPUC to provide local exchange services in part of the service
regions of Pacific Bell and GTE California. Most have sought to offer
business services only in population centers on a resale basis, but some,
including AT&T, propose to provide in all cities both business and residential
services from resale and from their own facilities. Less than 5% of
subscribers switched to an entrant in the first year, and less than 10% of

111. Id.
112. Id. at 56-58.
113. Pacific Bell Application, supra note 79, at 28.
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those that switched receive service from a facilities-based provider capable
of offering itself as a competitive alternative to the incumbent local exchange
carrier. The results of pro-competitive initiatives of the CPUC have turned
out in the first round to be similar to those in local toll markets: substantial
entry and price reductions in highly specialized service to large-scale business
subscribers had already taken place; there have been no changes in the
broadly based message toll services (MTS) and small business markets.
IV. ESTABLISHING COMPETITIVENESS IN
LONG-DISTANCE SERVICES

A.

The January 1995 Experiment

The CPUC has taken a different approach towards competition in
long-distance service markets. Its regulation of the provision of within-state
call access and transmission has been shared with the FCC. The intraLATA
access charge policies of the CPUC have followed those of the FCC on
interLATA, and the CPUC has allowed local carriers to enter within-states
but interLATA, long-distance service markets without prior approval by the
FCC.
That was the case until the CPUC's "natural experiment" of January 1,
1995. That experiment involved reducing access charges to generate more
"competitive" intrastate long-distance prices. The largest single component
of long-distance service costs in California are access charges, which are fees
paid by the interexchange carriers to the local carriers for passing on
long-distance calls placed locally. At the time of the AT&T divestiture,
approximately $16 billion of annual costs associated with local plant and
equipment, to be recovered through earnings from long-distance services, was
divided equally between interstate and intrastate services. The interstate
portion earnings after divestiture here shifted to access charges, to be levied
at both the originating and terminating ends of a toll call.1" 4 Initially set
at roughly $0.06 per minute, these access charges have been decreased by
state and federal regulatory decrees; they initially accounted for 40% of interLATA revenues, but now account for less than 25% of those revenues. In
its IRD proceeding, the CPUC lowered intrastate access charges for
interLATA switched services effective January 1, 1995.115 The magnitude
of the reduction (Table Eleven) was large - carriers' marginal costs of
interLATA intrastate switched toll service fell from $0.065 per minute to

114. LESTER D. TAYLOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
6 (1994).
115. See generally 1994 Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 56 CPUC 2d at 117.
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$0.037 per minute. 16 To the extent that toll markets were "competitive,"
the experiment consisted of imposing that cost reduction and waiting for the
market to produce commensurably large long-distance, within-state price
reductions.
The experiment failed. In response to this 44% decrease in marginal
costs, AT&T, MCI, and Sprint reduced standard MTS prices by 3%, 3%, and
0%, respectively." 7 Cost reductions to long-distance carriers as a result of
the California IRD decision were not passed on in price reductions to
consumers.
Instead, long-distance carriers' price-cost margins rose
substantially (Table Twelve).
Such increases in margins are consistent with the development of
coordinated price-setting practices by AT&T, MCI, and Sprint. Their actions
in failing to reduce intrastate MTS prices following the significant reduction
in their marginal costs speak louder on "competitiveness" than do television
advertising slogans for discount calling plans.
TABLE ELEVEN
INTEREXCHANGE CARRIERS' MARGINAL COST OF

INTRASTATE SWITCHED SERVICE MARGINAL COST

($/min)
Costs
Originating
Switched Access

Terminating
Switched Access

Network

Total

01/01/92

0.031

0.030

0.008

0.068

01/01/93

0.030

0.030

0.008

0.067

01/01/94

0.030

0.030

0.008

0.066

07/30/94

0.030

0.030

0.008

0.065

12/01/94

0.030

0.030

0.008

0.065

01/01/95

0.015

0.015

0.008

0.037

Date

Note: The magnitude of the increased margins is shown, reporting the carriers' price-cost margin
before and after the decline in access costs. Margins increased from approximately 50% to 70%
following the implementation of the IRD.

116. This assumes an average call length of 3.86 minutes, which equals the average number
of minutes for calls on Pacific Bell that are transferred to interexchange carriers.
117. These percentage price reductions are based on intrastate standard MTS calls of 100
miles, given a time-of-day calling distribution of 85% in the day, 10% in the evening, and 5%
at night/weekend.
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TABLE TWELVE
PRICE-COST MARGINS FOR STANDARD MTS
BEFORE AND AFTER CPUC REDUCTION IN ACCESS CHARGES

(%)

Date

AT&T

MCI

Sprint

0.52

0.52

0.52

0.72

0.72

0.72

Dec. 1994

May 1995

Source: HTL Telemanagement, LTD. and CPUC/Pacific Bell. Distance of 100 miles. Price-cost
margin equals price minus marginal cost divided by price.

B.

Competitiveness of Market Structure in
California Long-Distance Services

The structure of the California markets can be characterized by the
number and relative size of firms providing long-distance services to
households and businesses in the state. Measures of relative size or
concentration include, most prominently, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI)." 8 The HHI equals the sum of the squared shares of firm sales. For
example, a single-carrier market (monopoly) yields an HI equal to 1.0,
while a market with three equal-sized carriers yields an HHI equal to 0.33.
This measure is both tractable and analytically convenient because the
denominator of its fractional value equals the number of equal-sized carriers.
For example, an HHI of 0.5 is consistent with two equal-sized carriers, and
an HHI of 0.33 is consistent with three equal-sized carriers.
According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, a market with an HIHI in excess
of 0.18 (equivalent to 5.50 equal-sized firms) is considered "highly
concentrated"; a market with an HHI between 0.10 (the-equivalent of 10
equal-sized firms) and 0.18 is considered "moderately concentrated"; and a
market with an HHI of less than 0.10 is considered "unconcentrated" for
purposes of evaluating the competitive effects of mergers that have the
potential of regulating in a firm with the power to set prices.
Prior to examining the His for specific services, it is instructive to
review the trend in the shares of market of the major facilities-based carriers
for all interLATA toll services in California. The most recent data for

118. The HHI may be presented in two forms: as having a value between zero and one,
or as having a value between zero and one thousand. The former is adopted here because
comparisons are made to price-cost margins, which also lie between zero and one. The latter
method is used by the U.S. Dept. of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
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aggregate shares, covering 1984 to 1991, show a decline in AT&T's share
from 1984 to 1989 and stability from 1990 to 1991 (Table Thirteen). MCI's
share increased rapidly from 1984 to 1990 and then stabilized, while Sprint's
share increased from 1984 to 1986 and then stabilized. The resulting HHI
series shows a rapid fall from 1984 to 1989 by half, followed by a leveling
off for 1989 to 1991. Table Thirteen also indicates some possible shifts of
shares. AT&T's share fell rapidly from 1984 to 1987, a decrease accounted
for by an increase in Sprint's shares.
TABLE THIRTEEN
SHARES OF TOTAL MINUTES-OF-USE IN CALIFORNIA

(%)

Year

AT&T

MCI

Sprint

HHI

1984

100

0

0

1.0

1985

88

5

6

0.78

1986

80

8

10

0.66

1987

77

9

11

0.61

1988

76

11

11

0.59

1989

70

14

12

0.52

1990

67

17

12

0.49

1991

65

18

13

0.47

Source: Commission Advisory and Compliance Div., CPUC, Report on 1991 California Interexchange Market Monitoring Plan, Exhibit 5 (Dec. 1994).

But questions of market power can only be addressed by considering a
firm's share of services in specific markets. Because carriers establish prices
for services in markets, concentration measured at that level of aggregation
leads to inferences about control of price. Of central interest is concentration
in MTS markets, where that service is purchased by residential and small
business consumers. The HHI for intrastate toll service was 0.72 in 1986;
then annually, it gradually declined to 0.43 in 1994." 9 The relatively low
level of this index by the mid-1990s would support a hypothesis of
competitiveness. However, actual price-cost margins on MTS services for
the three carriers rebut this. Since 1986, as HHI declined, the firms'
price-cost margins increased from 30% to, most recently, 65% (Figure One).

119. The slight rise in the HHI in 1993 and 1994 may be due to the fact that the source
of the HHI statistics changed from the CPUC to Pacific Bell so that information from other
local exchange carriers is excluded in the last two years.
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FIGURE ONE
CALIFORNIA INTRASTATE RESIDENTIAL PRICE-COST MARGINS

AND MARKET CONCENTRATION FOR BASIC MTS
Price-Cost Margin and HI
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Sprint

Sources: Marginal Costs from Pacific Bell Rates from HTL Telenanagemnent Ltd.; and Market Concentration from
CPUC/Pacific Bll.

The other major category of service is business outbound WATS, by
which business customers place long-distance voice or data calls using either
switched or dedicated access, and billing is based on a bulk rather than an
individual call basis. The HHI for the intrastate outbound WATS market fell
from 0.98 in 1986 to 0.19 in 1989, and then increased to 0.32 by 1992
(Figure Two). The intrastate HH series compiled by the CPUC does include
resellers. The CPUC was able to remove resellers for one year, 1992, and
the facilities-based intrastate HHI for that year equaled 0.37, approximately
the same as the interstate HHI. This suggests that the decline in the HHI
from 0.46 in 1988 to 0.18 in 1989 may be due to the presence of resellers,
whose relative importance in the market diminished after 1990.12°

In neither market, however, did resellers influence pricing. As a provider
of an arbitrage service, dependent on the facilities of AT&T, MCI, or Sprint,
resellers could not significantly influence the levels of tariff charges. Despite
the presence of resellers in the WATS marketplace, price-cost margins for
intrastate switched outbound WATS services indicate that the interstate
market has become more profitable. Interstate price-cost margins increased,
if unsteadily, from 35% to 55% from their 1988 base to 1994 (Figure Two).

120. Based on conversations with CPUC and Pacific Bell staff (Oct. 1996).
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FIGURE Two
CALIFORNIA INTRASTATE RESIDENTIAL PRICE-COST MARGINS AND
MARKET CONCENTRATION FOR WATS SWITCHED OUTBOUND
Price-Cost Margin and HIU
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Notes: Service for 100 hours per month Distance of 100 miles.
Sources: Marginal Costs from Pacific Bell; Rates from HTL Telemanagnent, Ltd.; and Market Concentration from

CPUC/Pacific Bell.

The market for inbound WATS or 800 services has grown rapidly in the
last five years. Inbound WATS business customers receive long-distance
voice or data calls using either switched or dedicated access on bulk billing
plans. The HHI for intrastate inbound WATS was 0.66 in 1988, fell to 0.37
by 1992, and reached its low value of 0.35 in 1994. But price-cost margins
for switched inbound service increased more rapidly and achieved levels that
exceeded those of intrastate outbound WATS (Figure Three).
Table Fourteen presents another view on these findings. Standard MTS
price-cost margins do not differ significantly from WATS price-cost margins.
Discount plans for both MTS and for large-volume business customers, in the
form of WATS offerings, have not succeeded in pushing prices down
towards costs (Figure Four). These indicate a wide divergence between
hypotheses to be developed from concentration and those in conformance
with this pattern of pricing over time. The long-distance California markets
have become less concentrated, but margins have increased over the
twelve-year period. This substantially discounts the efficacy of regulatory
policy in making long-distance markets more competitive.
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FIGURE THREE
CALIFORNIA INTRASTATE RESIDENTIAL PRICE-COST MARGINS AND
MARKET CONCENTRATION FOR WATS SWITCHED INBOUND
Price-Cost Margin and HM
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TABLE FOURTEEN
MEASURES OF COMPETITIVENESS FOR INTRASTATE LONG-DISTANCE SERVICES

Service Market
MTS

MTS Discount

WATS Inbound

WATS Outbound

Date

HHI

P/Ca

P/C

HHI

P/C

HHI

P/C

1988

0.52

0.42

--

0.66

0.35

0.48

0.42

1990

0.47

0.44

--

0.45

0.40

0.20

0.35

1992

0.40

0.48

0.38

0.37

0.53

0.32

0.40

1994

0.43

0.50

0.40

0.35

0.60

--

0.45

1996

--

0.65

0.65

..

....

Source: Marginal costs from FCC, rates from HTL Telemanagement, Ltd., and market concentration from Multinational Business Services.
'P/C, Price-Cost margin.
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FIGURE FOUR
CALIFORNIA INTRASTATE RESIDENTIAL PRICE-COST MARGINS AND
MARKET CONCENTRATION FOR DISCOUNT MTS CALLING PLANS
Pric-Cot Margin and Hi
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Note: AT&T discount calling plan is True Savings; MCI discount calling plan is Friends & Family I; and Sprint

discount calling plan is Select - Day Option.
Sources:

Marginal Costs from Pacific Bell; Rates from HTL Telemanagement, Ltd; and Market cncnno

forom

CPUC/Pacific Bell.

C.

Regulation in Long-Distance Markets

The HHI series indicate that there is some probability that structures in
the three most relevant markets may have become more competitive since
1984. Since all HIs exceeded 0.25 (the equivalent of four equal-sized
firms) in 1994, the presumption could be that one of these firms would
undercut the dominant firm's tariff and prices in order to gain sales, with the
result that any one of a variety of price-reducing outcomes would be realized.
To the contrary, even with this many equal-sized firms, high price-cost
margins could persist. That is, in general, practices involving setting separate
prices in a coordinated sequence can evolve, with each firm being aware of
its potential losses from price-cutting sufficient to avoid such actions.
Parallel actions can arise through the mutual, simultaneous recognition of
strategies to maintain high price-cost margins.
One important market condition that enhances the ability of interexchange carriers to engage in such coordinating practices is the pricenotification feature inherent in CPUC tariff filing requirements. These
requirements facilitate coordination by providing abundant a priori infor-
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12 1
Delays
mation on rivals' proposed price changes before they take effect.
that
learn
to
ability
supplier's
each
enhance
caused by ensuing protests
share
responsive discounts will make any proposed cut for market
unprofitable. 2 2 Table Fifteen provides the chronology of the CPUC's
tariff-setting policies from January 1984 to May 1993 (the last time the
policy was altered) and indicates that all carriers desiring to offer interLATA
services had to file tariffs with the CPUC. This requirement provides ample
opportunity to observe and respond to rivals' rate changes prior to the
effective date of a new rate.
In addition to this process, other regulatory conditions support coordination. As few firms with stable market shares had similar cost levels,
there were considerable barriers to entry in most markets. 123 Shifts in
market shares among the three large carriers have all but disappeared in
recent years. Costs for the major carriers have been virtually identical.
Marginal costs of interexchange carriers have consisted of access charges,
which have been the same for such firms, and the network costs of
completing a call, one to two cents per minute per carrier. Each firm offered
essentially the same set of services with comparable quality of interconnection and transmission. Finally, barriers to entry have been substantial for
facilities-based carriers; while numerous firms have entered by leasing
effective alternate capacity to the three major
capacity, they have not offered
124
facilities-based carriers.
Thus, conditions favorable to tacit collusion have existed in long-distance
service in California during this period, fostered by not only the regulatory
process but also the structural aspects of markets beyond concentration. To
determine the extent of this type of price behavior in the "pro-competitive"
period of regulation, changes in price-cost margins are reviewed for two sets
of markets: those for interstate services for California-based callers and those

121. See generally L. PHLIPS, PRICE LEADERSHIP AND CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM: A
SURVEY (European Univ. Inst. Jan. 1993).
122. Firms may seek to forestall their rivals from using the ability to cut prices by utilizing
the regulatory structure and process. For instance, in an industry divided between a dominant
regulated price leader and followers, by confronting the shift from a rate-of-return regime to
a price-cap regime, an unregulated firm may seek to influence the leader to price at or just
below the cap, by incurring a sunk cost prior to the shift. Just before the onset of price caps,
the follower may raise its prices, and by so doing, eliminate from the leader's consideration
all price structures that do not allow the follower to recover the foregone profit. David S.
Sibley & S.J. Wilkie, A Repeated Game Model of Price Cap Regulation (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Sibley & Wilkie).
123. The theory of tacit collusion was introduced by Edward Chamberlin in 1929. Edward
H. Chamberlin, Duopoly: Value Where Sellers Are Few, 43 Q. J. ECON. 63-100. The modem
theory of tacit collusion is based on the work of game theorists. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS ch. 6 (1988).
124. CALIFORNIA PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, INTEREXCHANGE CARRIERS (Mar. 24, 1994).
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for interLATA services within California. The specific markets investigated
are MTS, WATS switched and dedicated outbound, and WATS switched and
dedicated inbound.

TABLE FIFTEEN -

January
1984

*
*

*
*
June
1984
*
*
*

August
1990

*
*

o

October
1991

December
1991

*

CALIFORNIA TARIFF FILING REQUESTS

Divestiture of BOCs from AT&T in accordance with the MFJ.
Initial tariffs become effective 1 day after filing with CPUC.
Subsequent tariffs become effective 5 days after filing with CPUC.
Tariff changes for interstate service effective on FCC effective date.
CPUC adopts dominant/nondominant carrier framework for its
regulation of intrastate interLATA competition, and names
AT&T-C as the dominant carrier.
AT&T-C must provide service to all routes.
All intrastate interLATA rates must be uniform on a distance basis.
Carriers without existing FCC rates or who wish to file California-specific rates, file tariffs with the CPUC to provide services.
FCC-approved rates become effective 1 day after filing with CPUC.
Uniform rate reductions for existing services effective on 5 days'
notice.
Uniform rate increases for existing services effective on 30 days'
notice; CPUC requires bill inserts or first-class mailings to notify
customers.
Advice letter filings for new services and for all other types of
tariff revisions effective on 40 days' notice.
New entrants wishing to provide interexchange carrier service must
show $400,000 (escalated 5%/yr) uncommitted cash or equivalent
resources to obtain certificate of public convenience and necessity.
New entrants wishing to provide switchless reseller service must
show $75,000 (escalated 5%/yr) uncommitted cash or equivalent
resources to obtain certificate of public convenience and necessity.
CPUC defines a minor increase as "an increase in rates, which in
addition to all prior increases during the last 12 months, does not
increase the nondominant interexchange carrier's revenues by more
than one percent (1%) and does not increase rates for the effected
service by more than five percent (5%)."
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TABLE FiFTEEN continued
December
1991

*

•
*
*
•

February
1993

*
•

Uniform non-minor rate increases effective on 30 days' notice;
CPUC requires bill inserts, notice on bill itself, or first-class
mailing to notify customers.
Uniform minor rate increases effective on 5 working days' notice;
CPUC requires bill inserts or notice on bill to notify customers.
Advice letter filings for new services and other tariff revisions
effective on 40 days' notice.
Advice letter filings that revise text or location of text without
changing rates or charges effective on 5 working days' notice.
AT&T-C granted authority to operate under similar regulations and
notice procedures as nondominant interexchange carriers for the
following existing services: WATS, 800, private line, and MTS.
AT&T must, however, price above its long run incremental cost.
AT&T-C must offer geographically nondiscriminatory rates
statewide for standard and new services.
AT&T-C must introduce all new services on a statewide basis.
AT&T-C may not abandon any service except by formal application to CPUC.

May
1993

New entrants wishing to provide interexchange carrier service must
show $100,000 in uncommitted cash or equivalent resources to
obtain certificate of public convenience and necessity.
New entrants wishing to provide switchless reseller service must
show $25,000 in uncommitted cash or equivalent resources to
obtain certificate of public convenience and necessity.

Source: Author compilation from CPUC dockets and case files.

Price indices for charges per minute per call have been constructed based
125
on calling patterns that fit California-based customers (Table Sixteen).
These patterns differ from those for nationwide price indices, which utilize
calling pattern assumptions designed to fit customers located on the East
Coast. The two most important differences are (1) the distance that calls
travel is greater for California than for East Coast customers and (2) the

125. InterLATA, interstate, and intrastate prices were calculated by HTL Telemanagement
by taking the assumed calling patterns and applying them to tariffs that AT&T, MCI, and
Sprint maintain on files at the FCC and CPUC.
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time-of-day distribution of calls is earlier in the day for customers located in
California. It is also assumed that the customer is located in the 415 area
code (San Francisco) and makes calls to each area outside of California with
an equal probability. For intrastate calls, the mileage is assumed to be 100
miles for all interLATA calls.
TABLE SIXTEEN
CALLING-PATTERN ASSUMPTIONS FOR INTERSTATE CALLS

Time of Day

Distribution (%)

Day

75

Evening

15

Night/Weekend

10

Miles

Distribution (%)

0-55

0

56-292

0

293-430

1

431-925

8

926-1,910

37

1,911-3,000

54

Source: As described in the text.

Marginal costs are defined as the change in total costs resulting from an
increase in total message minutes per carrier. For long-distance service,
marginal costs are comprised of (1) access charges paid to local exchange
carriers, plus (2) the direct costs of operating the long-distance, fiber-optic
network required to complete a call. Access charges for interstate calls,
equal to the rates of local exchange carriers, are from the CPUC tariffs for
switched access. Access charges on dedicated lines for long-distance services
are from Pacific Bell; these charges are used to estimate interstate dedicated
access marginal costs for outbound and inbound business services. Access
charges for intrastate, interLATA calls per minute for both switched and
dedicated (outbound and inbound) access are also from Pacific Bell.
Estimates of the network costs per minute for a long-distance call are
reported by AT&T for WATS outbound and inbound (800) services in Table

1997)
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Seventeen. 2 6 Alternatively, the Wharton Economic Forecasting (WEFA)
Group reports a network cost of service equal to $0.01 per minute, which is
in accord with AT&T's cost estimates.1 27 In the analysis that follows,
AT&T's cost estimates are used for switched and dedicated WATS outbound
and inbound services, and the WEFA Group's estimate is used for MTS.
TABLE SEVENTEEN

AT&T ESTIMATES OF LONG RUN NETWORK COSTS FOR LONG-DISTANCE CALLS
($/min)
WATS Outbound
Switched Service

WATS Outbound
Dedicated Service

WATS Inbound
Switched Service

WATS Inbound
Dedicated Service

Pro WATS
0.0101

Megacom WATS
0.0130

Ready Line 800
0.0108

Megacom 800
0.0129

Source: Direct testimony of John Sumpter, supra note 126.

D.

MTS PricingBehavior

From these estimates, price-cost margins have been calculated as price
index, minus marginal costs, divided by price index. The price-cost margins
of AT&T's, MCI's, and Sprint's MTS offerings within California increased
and then decreased in a series of steps from 1987 to early 1990, but they
then increased systematically from mid-1990 to January 1994 (Figure One).
Most important, these margins increased even though HHI had declined over
that period. The same trend of increasing margins held for price indices
estimated from discount calling plans (Figure Four). In addition, individual
firms' prices converged over time so that by 1991, changes in margins were
virtually identical. Inter- and intrastate price-cost margins for California
MTS are quite similar. Interstate margins generally exceed intrastate
margins, as a result of two factors: (1) intrastate prices for 100-mile calls
(the assumed distance) are substantially less than interstate prices for calls up
to 3,000 miles, but (2) the marginal costs of intrastate calls are not
substantially lower than the marginal costs of interstate calls. Call prices are
based on distance; costs are not. Relatively higher interstate margins indicate
that the carriers discriminate against consumers making calls traveling long

126. John Sumpter, Testimony on Behalf of AT&T Communications of California, Inc.,
Application of AT&T Communications of California, Inc. (U 5002 C) for Authority to Provide
Intrastate AT&T 800 READYLINE Service (June 18, 1990).
127. WEFA GROUP, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ELIMINATING THE LINE-OF-BuSINESS
RESTRICTIONS ON THE BELL COMPANIES 20-21 (Bala Cynwyd PA 1993) (citing Bellcore data).
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distances, just as they had under rate regulation for decades before divestiture."' Practicing such price discrimination serves as proof of the ability
to exercise market power both during and after divestiture. To be sure,
interexchange carriers earn lower price-cost margins for intrastate services
than for interstate services; but both intrastate margins and interstate margins
rose consistently over the period from 1987 to 1994, despite systematic
declines in market concentration.
E.

WATS Service Pricing

Price-cost margins for intrastate outbound WATS increased for MCI and
Sprint from approximately 35% in 1989 to 50% in 1994. AT&T's margin
did not fall, instead, MCI and Sprint levels moved up to AT&T's margin in
the 40% to 50% range. This convergence reduced the dispersion in margins
substantially after 1989 (Figure Two). Price-cost margins for interstate
outbound WATS increased from 1987 to 1993, by 5% per year. Margins
rose from approximately 45% in 1987-1988 to approximately 70% for each
firm by the beginning of 1994. Thus, margins in the two sets of markets
followed a similar pattern, although the variation among the three carriers'
margins was more substantial in the intrastate than in the interstate market.
By 1993, both the inter- and intrastate outbound WATS price-cost
margins were at the same level as inter- and intrastate MTS margins. Since
WATS subscribers are generally more price-sensitive than MTS subscribers,
this is surprising. It suggests that even large, sophisticated WATS buyers
were unable to obtain service at lower prices net of incremental costs than
residential customers. Since interexchange carriers have a larger profit
incentive to take away a large rather than a small customer from a rival, this
result shows the ability of the carriers to maintain tacitly cooperative
outcomes.
In California, interstate WATS inbound service margins increased from
45% in 1987 to 65% by 1994, while concentration in the supply of services
decreased rapidly until 1991, and then less rapidly up to 1994. The
dispersion in margins decreased after 1990, with AT&T able to maintain
somewhat higher margins than MCI and Sprint. Price-cost margins for
128. Consider that given the calling pattern assumptions, AT&T's price for an interstate
MTS call equals $0.2462 per minute (as of Jan. 14, 1994), while the marginal cost of
interstate switched service equals $0.0766 per minute. For an intrastate MTS call, AT&T's
price equals $0.1364 per minute (as of Jan. 1994), while the marginal cost intrastate switched
service equals $0.0658 per minute. Using the economic definition of price discrimination as
differences in prices not accounted for by differences in costs, the observed prices and costs
demonstrate that the AT&T price discriminates against customers making interstate calls. This
explains why the price-cost margin for interstate calls, based on these prices and marginal
costs, equals 0.69, which exceeds the price-cost margin for intrastate calls, which in this
instance equals 0.52.
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intrastate inbound WATS (using switched access) increased for MCI and
Sprint from approximately 40% in 1988 to 60% in 1994 (Figure Three).
AT&T was able to maintain higher margins than MCI and Sprint, but
AT&T's margins also moved up more slowly, from approximately 63% in
1990 to 67% in 1994. At the same time, AT&T's market share almost
halved, from 99% in 1986 to 51% in 1994, while MCI's and Sprint's shares
rose from 2% and 0% in 1987 to 24% and 16% in 1994, respectively.
Accordingly, the HHI fell from 0.99 in 1986 to 0.34 in 1994, as market share
disparity lessened across the three firms. Despite these changes in the
direction of more equal shares among firms, prices increased relative to costs,
as reflected in the growing margins in the direction of less "competitive"
market behavior. As was the case with outbound WATS switched service,
customers of inbound WATS switched service, despite their presumed greater
bargaining power, have been unable to extract lower prices net of costs from
the three largest interexchange carriers.
F. Price Sensitivity to Calling PatternAssumptions
Margins were calculated for calls to be representative of a customer from
the 415 area code (San Francisco) to interstate locations in each area outside
of California with equal probability. Intrastate call prices to specific
locations were also representative of (1) time-of-day usage, (2) mileage
The
distribution, and (3) monthly calling volume (Table Eighteen).
time-of-day usage levels can be varied for interstate calls according to the
values shown in Table Eighteen.
With respect to mileage distributions, intrastate calls can be assumed to
travel 25, 200, or 300 miles, in addition to the base case of 100 miles. The
interstate calling pattern remains the base case scenario which assumes, in
effect, that there is one call from area code 415 (San Francisco) to each area
code in the United States outside of California. Monthly calling volumes can
be varied for inbound and outbound WATS services from 25 to 500 hours
per month for switched services, and 500 to 5000 hours per month for
dedicated services.
Sensitivity analyses undertaken with all combinations of these assumptions lead to the conclusion that prices do not change significantly with
respect to calling patterns. Interstate prices do not change significantly when
varying either the time-of-day pattern or the mileage assumptions, at least not
enough to change price-cost margins. The only price-cost margin series that
varies as the mileage assumption changes is that for MTS, which at 25 miles
is higher than at 200 or 300 miles over the period from 1985 to 1990.
However, all three margin series converge after 1990 until 1994, in the range
of 0.45 to 0.52. Finally, rates at different monthly usage levels did not
change sufficiently to cause price-cost margins to vary; gradual declines in
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margins were realized for all cases for inbound and outbound WATS
services, with declines corresponding to the volume discounts discussed in
the next section.
TABLE EIGHTEEN
CALLING-PATTERN ASSUMPTIONS FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
TIME-OF-DAY DISTRIBUTION

Alternative Distributions (%)
Time of Day

One

Two

Three

Four

Day

65

75

80

85

Evening

20

10

10

10

Night/Weekend

15

15

10

5

Source: As described in text.

G.

The Competitiveness of Long Distance

Although the changes in price-cost margins were not identical among the
six long-distance service markets, there was a pattern of rising margins and
thus, movement toward less manifestation of pricing competition over the last
decade. With shares and revenues becoming more equal among AT&T,
MCI, and Sprint (relative to the case of the mid 1980s), substantially lower
HI's resulted. There should have been more, not less, downward pressure
on price-cost margins over the late 1980s and early 1990s. But price-cost
margins increased, so much so that no pressure was realized toward more
competitive price formation.
The pattern of WATS service prices net of marginal costs compared to
MTS prices net of costs reveals that interexchange carriers have been able to
maintain the same margins across the full range of services, given that
concentration levels vary widely across the different markets. In addition,
because WATS customers can self-supply at least parts of their telecommunications, elasticities of demand vary across markets. But, rather than
cutting prices (net of costs) for services offered to more price-sensitive
buyers, carriers maintained the same high margins on all large service
categories (Tables Nineteen and Twenty).
Tables Nineteen and Twenty indicate that margins earned on WATS
generally equal or exceed margins earned on MTS for both inter- and
intrastate service offerings. They also indicate that margins have not varied
according to HHIs in the way that noncollusive pricing would, that is, lower
1HI did not lead to correspondingly lower margins. The carriers have been
able to avoid the outbreak of price competition that would be anticipated
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given the fall in market concentration. Some factor prevented the large-scale
customers from exercising any ability to reduce profit margins in excess of
competitive levels. These results lead inexorably to the conclusion that there
has been tacit price coordination across the three large long-distance carriers.
TABLE NINETEEN

AVERAGE PRICE-COST MARGINS AND HHIs FOR INTERSTATE SERVICES

(1992-1994)
Average Price-Cost Margin
AT&T, MCI, Sprint

HHI

MTS

0.65

0.52

WATS Outbound

0.65

0.27

WATS Inbound

0.64

0.40

Service Category

Source: As described in the text.

TABLE TWENTY

AVERAGE PRICE-COST MARGINS AND HHIS FOR INTRASTATE SERVICES
(1992-1994)
Average Price-Cost Margin
AT&T, MCI, Sprint

HHI

MTS

0.52

0.43

WATS Outbound

0.48

0.33

WATS Inbound

0.62

0.35

Service Category

Source: As described in the text.

Further, price-cost margins do not provide evidence to support the theory
that competition is intense in services for which there are discount calling
plans. With respect to discount plans on standardM TS for residential
consumers, price-cost margins are determined by percentage discounts off
standard tariffs; they have therefore increased in line with increases in
margins for MTS standard services. In addition, discounts as a percentage
of standard tariff rates decreased so that coordination on pricing decisions
among the three large carriers improved over the period.
In fact, price-cost margins based on MTS discount index prices for
AT&T, Sprint, and MCI increased by almost half in the last two years
(Figure Four). The approximately 65% of these margins in discount plans
compares with that earned by carriers on standard MTS after 1994. That the
margins earned by AT&T, MCI, and Sprint in their discount MTS increased
markedly, even though there was a substantial decline in market con-
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centration, indicates that there was not increased competition even in
discounting. Discount prices were not used to undertake competitive
initiatives to increase a carrier's market share. Discount plans did not signal
even a partial breakdown in the tacitly collusive behavior that characterized
the market for standard MTS.
Thus, prices in long-distance service markets have not become competitive, contrary to the intent of the regulatory reform process. Residential
customers on discount calling plans account for only a minority of MTS
subscribers, and large-volume business subscribers on discount plans have
been few and have paid prices that generate substantially the same margins
as those elsewhere.'2 9 Prices have not turned out to be "competitive." As
carrier shares have equalized and share concentration has declined, price-cost
margins have increased.
H.

The CPUC and Long-Distance
Market Competitiveness

In the early post-divestiture years, AT&T's share of total interLATA calls
originating in California exceeded 90%. Presumably, this dominant carrier
could earn more by maintaining price-cost margins on service to its large
customer base than by decreasing margins in an effort to slow erosion of its
share. But by the early 1990s, with its share reduced to only 65%, the
importance of reducing prices to retain customers increased. At the same
time, MCI's and Sprint's large shares provided them with increased
incentives not to cut prices, but instead, to match AT&T's prices, since cuts
would render their relatively new, but by now established, customer base less
profitable. By the early 1990s, the individual, as well as the collective best,
strategy was to stabilize relative shares and increase prices.
What other explanation for rising price-cost margins could there be?
MTS prices of the three interexchange carriers declined from 1987 to 1991.
They then stopped failing and began gradually increasing. Between 1991 and
1996, they increased by more than 20%, and they also became virtually
identical. Similar behavior is observed in the price change behavior of
WATS outbound and inbound markets. Prices have been rising, and
incremental direct costs falling. Price coordination rather than competition
has dominated price-cost margins in the six most important long-distance
markets in California since 1990.
The implications for regulatory policy in California are disastrous. In its
1993 report to Governor Wilson, the CPUC emphasized the importance of
enhancing competition for establishing an advanced telecommunications

129. Affidavit of Professors Harris and Shapiro in, United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
Civil Action No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. 1982) (HHG).
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infrastructure in California. The CPUC cited the key role of a new policy of
removing barriers to the introduction of new services and to entry in existing
telecommunications services in achieving this goal. But regulatory policy,
in fact, has expanded regulation of entry and pricing of services offered by
long-distance carriers in California. And the behavior of price-cost margins
in the 1990s provides evidence that markets for interLATA long-distance
services in California have not become competitive.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The California Public Utilities Commission, with the best of intentions,
seeks to manage the transition from franchise monopoly to competitive
service provision in a myriad of markets for local exchange, toll, and
long-distance services. It does so with the orthodox tools of regulation of the
franchised single provider, that is, selection of entrants to provide duplicative
service, price control of entrants and incumbents, and requirements for
provision of service. But these controls have been applied to established
carriers for existing services, whose prices have been previously set to
subsidize local exchange services for low-density subscribers. Thus, by their
nature they have not facilitated an interaction with entrants that has resulted
in prices being set competitively.
To the contrary, in markets for local exchange and message toll and for
household and small business subscribers, prices have gone down only by
CPUC decree. And, the franchised local exchange provider still has the
franchise, but without the sources of revenue from high-density business
markets that provide the cash flow to continue subsidizing household
subscribers in local exchange services. The long-distance provider now has
rivals, but they are so few and the system is so managed by the regulatory
process that the results are manifest in tacitly collusive pricing.
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